

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA**

BARBARA L. HILL,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. CIV-07-179-RAW
	)	
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,	)	
Commissioner of Social	)	
Security Administration,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Plaintiff Barbara L. Hill ("Claimant") requests judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying Claimant's application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. Claimant appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and asserts that the Commissioner erred because the ALJ incorrectly determined that Claimant was not disabled. For the reasons discussed below, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

**Social Security Law and Standard of Review**

Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Social

Security Act "only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . ." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A). Social Security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.<sup>1</sup>

Judicial review of the Commissioner's determination is limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court's review is limited to two inquiries: first, whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence; and, second, whether the correct legal

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<sup>1</sup> Step one requires the claimant to establish that he is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, as defined by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910. Step two requires that the claimant establish that he has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limit his ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity (step one) or if the claimant's impairment is not medically severe (step two), disability benefits are denied. At step three, the claimant's impairment is compared with certain impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. A claimant suffering from a listed impairment or impairments "medically equivalent" to a listed impairment is determined to be disabled without further inquiry. If not, the evaluation proceeds to step four, where claimant must establish that he does not retain the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform his past relevant work. If the claimant's step four burden is met, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish at step five that work exists in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant - taking into account his age, education, work experience, and RFC - can perform. Disability benefits are denied if the Commissioner shows that the impairment which precluded the performance of past relevant work does not preclude alternative work. See generally, Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988).

standards were applied. Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The term "substantial evidence" has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to require "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The court may not re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its discretion for that of the agency. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, the court must review the record as a whole, and the "substantiality of the evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); see also, Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01.

#### **Claimant's Background**

Claimant was born on August 19, 1960 and was 45 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision. Claimant completed her education through the twelfth grade. Claimant has worked in the past an automobile parts runner and sheriff's department matron. Claimant alleges an inability to work beginning January 1, 1997, back pain, high blood pressure, depression, right shoulder pain, right arm pain, and numbness in both hands.

### **Procedural History**

On April 13, 2004, Claimant protectively filed for disability insurance benefits under Title II (42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.) and supplemental security income benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.). Claimant's applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. On August 14, 2006, a hearing was conducted by ALJ Charles Headrick. By decision dated November 1, 2006, the ALJ determined Claimant was not disabled during the relevant period and denied Claimant's request for benefits. On April 26, 2007, the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's decision. Thus, the decision of the ALJ represents the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of further appeal. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.

### **Decision of the Administrative Law Judge**

The ALJ made his decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. He determined that while certain of Claimant's medical conditions were severe, Claimant did not meet a listing and retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of light work.

### **Errors Alleged for Review**

Claimant asserts the ALJ committed error in (1) failing to properly evaluate the opinion of Claimant's treating physician; (2) failing to perform a proper determination at steps 2 and 3; (3)

failing to perform a proper determination at step 5; and (4) failing to perform a proper credibility evaluation.

### **Treating Physician's Opinion**

Claimant contends the ALJ failed to properly consider her treating physician's opinion. In his decision, the ALJ determined that Claimant suffered from the severe impairments of back pain and high blood pressure. (Tr. 23). However, he rejected Claimant's alleged impairments of depression, right shoulder pain, right arm pain, and numbness in both hands. Id.

On the issue of depression, the ALJ recognized the completion of a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form by a treating counselor dated July 21, 2006. (Tr. 26). The counselor noted moderate limitations upon Claimant's ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; ability to complete a normal work day and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; ability to interact appropriately with the general public; ability to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavior extremes; ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness; ability to travel to unfamiliar places or use public transportation; and

ability to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. Marked limitation was noted by the counselor in Claimant's ability to work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them. (Tr. 179-180).

Although not expressly stated, the ALJ appears to have rejected these limitations. Instead, he relies upon the psychiatric reports of Denise LeGrand, Psy.D. and R. E. Smallwood, Ph.D, neither of which were treating sources.

It is well-established that any time an ALJ rejects the opinion of a treating physician or fails to give it controlling weight, he must provide substantiation for that rejection. An ALJ is required to give the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight if it is both: (1) "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques"; and (2) "consistent with other substantial evidence in the record." Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). (quotation omitted). "[I]f the opinion is deficient in either of these respects, then it is not entitled to controlling weight." Id.

Even if a treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, "[t]reating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527." Id. (quotation omitted). The factors reference in that section are: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the

nature and extent of the treatment relationship, including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which the physician's opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ's attention which tend to support or contradict the opinion. Id. at 1300-01 (quotation omitted). After considering these factors, the ALJ must "give good reasons" for the weight he ultimately assigns the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Any such findings must be "sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinions and the reason for that weight." Id. "Finally, if the ALJ rejects the opinion completely, he must then give specific, legitimate reasons for doing so." Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301 (quotations omitted).

The ALJ appears not to have afforded the opinion of the treating counselor any weight nor provided any reason for doing so. He recognized the counselor as a treating source, which belies Defendant's argument that the Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form should be discounted because it was not completed by a treating physician or psychiatrist. On remand, the ALJ should provide specific reasons for the rejection of the treating sources

opinion.

Because consideration of this issue is dispositive of this review, this Court declines to discuss the other stated bases proffered by Claimant in this appeal. On remand, however, Defendant should consider Claimant's other arguments in the re-hearing and decision made on Claimant's application.

### **Conclusion**

The decision of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were not applied. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends for the above and foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration should be **REVERSED and REMANDED** for further proceedings.

The parties are herewith given ten (10) days from the date of the service of this Report and Recommendation to file with the Clerk of the court any objections, with supporting brief. Failure to object to the Report and Recommendation within ten (10) days will preclude appellate review of this decision by the District Court based on such findings.

DATED this 9th day of September, 2008.

  
KIMBERLY E. WEST  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE